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Introduction
In an effort to differentiate conceptually ambiguity from ambiguity attitude, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) introduce the α-maxmin model of preferences under Knightian uncertainty. These preferences can be represented by a utility function of the form
for a Bernoulli utility function u, a class of priors P, and an index of ambiguity attitude α ∈ [0, 1]. Such preferences generalize the well-known α-maxmin rule of Hurwicz to settings of Knightian uncertainty where the subjective perception of ambiguity can be described by a set of probability measures and the attitude towards ambiguity by a parameter α which describes the relative weight put on pessimism versus optimism 1 . In this paper, we discuss α-maxmin utility in a dynamic framework. For the purely pessimistic case (α = 1), Epstein and Schneider (2003) have shown that the multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is dynamically consistent if and only if the set of priors is rectangular, i.e. stable under pasting marginal and conditional distributions.
Our starting point is the following fact: Even if the set of priors is rectangular, α-maxmin utility is not time-consistent for non-trivial values of ambiguity attitude α.
We thus set out to define a recursive version of α-maxmin utility where we apply the logic of α-maxmin utility conditionally upon the available information in every discrete time step. Such a recursive construction leads to a timeconsistent overall utility function.
In discrete time, tractable representations of the resulting utility function are usually not available. The continuous-time limit of our recursive construction, however, admits a nice representation. The dynamic utility form satisfies the backward stochastic differential equation
where now the set Θ describes the perceived ambiguity. We thus obtain again an α-maxmin representation, but now locally, at the infinitesimal (one-step ahead) level 2 .
The representation of the utility functional as backward stochastic differential equation allows a more detailed study of its properties and the economic consequences for agents with such preferences. We discuss the properties of the utility functional and derive a representation for the certainty equivalent.
As an application, we show the implications for consumption-based asset pricing models. Ambiguity leads to an additional premium for uncertain assets, similar to Chen and Epstein (2002) . The ambiguity premium is reduced by optimism. The short interest rate increases usually with pessimism.
The paper is set up as follows. The next section shows that the naive version of α-maxmin utility is not dynamically consistent. Section 3 derives the recursive, dynamically consistent version and its continuous-time limit. Section 4 discusses the properties of the resulting preferences. Section 5 discusses the implications for equilibrium asset prices in the framework of the consumptionbased capital asset pricing model and the implications for derivative valuation if one uses the method of indifference pricing.
Dynamic Inconsistency of α-maxmin Utility
Gilboa-Schmeidler utility functions are dynamically consistent if (and only if) the set of priors is rectangular (Epstein and Schneider (2003) ). This result carries over to optimistic, ambiguity-loving agents (α = 0). For intermediate values of α, rectangularity is not sufficient for dynamic consistency as we show in this section with the help of two examples, in discrete and continuous time.
Consider the two period binomial tree of Figure 1 . The transition probabilities of moving up in the tree are given by p, q, r ∈ [ 1 4 , 3 4 ]. By construction, the resulting set of priors
is rectangular. We write p = q = r = 1 4 and p = q = r = 3 4 . Consider the two payoffs X and Y depicted in the figure. Note that Y has a payoff which is known at time 1 but uncertain at time 0. For simplicity 3 , we take u(x) = x and α = 1/2.
We first show that Y is uniformly preferred to X at time 1. Indeed, in the upper node, the utility of X is
which is strictly smaller than the utility of Y which is 4.1 (recall that Y is known at time 1). Similarly, in the lower node we obtain U 1 (X) = 2 < U 1 (Y ) = 2.2. Figure 1 : Two period binomial model and rectangular set of priors. For α = 1/2, the agent prefers X to Y ex ante and reverses the ranking in all nodes at time 1.
Now we show that the ranking is reversed at time 0. We compute 
Dynamic consistency is closely related to recursivity, or the dynamic programming principle. The iterated α-maxmin expected utility is U 0 U 1 [X] . We plug U 1 [X] = (4, 2) into U 0 and get
shows that recursivity fails. For our continuous-time example, we choose the drift ambiguity model of Chen and Epstein (2002) . Fix a finite time interval [0, T ]. Let B be a Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, F, P) and (F t ) t∈[0,T ] the filtration generated by B, and completed by null sets. The set of priors consists of all probability measures P θ such that B has drift θ under P θ . More specifically, we denote by Θ the set of all adapted processes θ = (θ t ) t∈[0,T ] with values in the interval [−1, 0]. The martingale
then defines a measure P θ under which B has drift θ by Girsanov's theorem. Now let us consider the three dates t = 0, t = 1 and T = 2. Again, we take α = 1 2 . Consider the payoffs X = e B T and Y = 1 2 (C + ε)e Bt for C = e 1 2 + e − 1 2 and ε > 0 sufficiently small. As we deal with drift ambiguity, and X is a monotone function of B T , the worst-case prior P assigns drift −1 and the best case prior drift 0, i.e. the reference measure P is the best prior.
At time t = 1, we thus get
Note that this is strictly smaller than
Again, the ranking is reversed at time 0.
3 Recursive α-maxmin utility and its
Continuous-Time Limit
This section introduces a dynamically consistent version of α-maxmin utility. We start with a recursive formulation in discrete time. Then we introduce the counterpart in continuous time. We show (Theorem 2) that the discrete-time version converges to the continuous-time version.
General Setup in Continuous Time
Fix a finite time interval [0, T ]. Let B be a Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, F, P). Let (F t ) t∈[0,T ] be the filtration generated by B, completed by P-null sets. Set L t = L 2 (Ω, F t , P), for every t ∈ [0, T ], the space of square integrable and F t -measurable random variables. Let Θ : Ω × [0, T ] ⇒ R be an adapted set-valued process and assume for every (ω, t) the set Θ t (ω) is a convex and closed subset of some compact set K ⊂ R. For a real-valued process θ = (θ t ) with θ t ∈ Θ t we define the density process
By the Girsanov theorem, z θ determines a probability measure P θ . Given Θ, we thus obtain a corresponding set of priors:
The induced set of priors P is weakly compact, convex and rectangular (see Chen and Epstein (2002) ).
Recursive α-maxmin utility in discrete time
On the probability space (Ω, F, P) with set of priors P introduced in (3), we construct a recursive α-maxmin utility in discrete time. For an integer N , we let ∆ = T N . The collection of all adapted processes (a t ) taking values in the unit interval [0, 1] is denoted by |[0, 1]|.
We define the (naive and time inconsistent) nonlinear expectation, for X ∈ L T and t ∈ [0, T ].
Let u be a concave and increasing function. We construct a recursive utility in discrete time as follows. For the terminal time t = T , we define
For t ∈ [i∆, (i + 1)∆), where i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, we define
By construction the family (U i∆ ) i=0,...,N is a family of recursive utilities.
Continuous-Time Limit of α-maxmin utility
The continuous-time setup allows to describe the recursive relation of nonlinear conditional expectations in differential terms. This differential formulation in (5) is the continuous-time counterpart of (4).
For every a ∈ |[0, 1]| and every X ∈ L T , there exists a unique solution
with 4 E T [X] = X.
Example 1 1. If Θ = {θ} is a singleton, then a t is irrelevant and we obtain the usual linear expectation
, where the subjective prior P θ is again given by (2).
2. If a ≡ 1, i.e., a form of maximal pessimism in beliefs, then E t [X] = min P ∈P E P t [X] reduces to the continuous-time analog of Gilboa-Schmeidler preferences of Chen and Epstein (2002) . The case of an extremely optimistic expectation E t [X] is obtained 5 with a ≡ 0.
The BSDE formulation of E t implies a dynamic stability of the functional form. In the notation of Example 1, the comparison principle for BSDEs yields
for any X and time t. Consequently, there is a process (α X t ) ∈ |[0, 1]|, depending on (a t ) and X, that allows for a global representation
The dynamically inconsistent expectation of Section 2 employed a constant weight α ≡ α X t . A stochastic and X-dependent α X t provides the dynamic consistency of E t . For perspective, Proposition 5 in Appendix B collects a list of further properties.
The following theorem establishes the announced connection between the discrete-and continuous-time formulation.
Theorem 2 Let u be concave and increasing. For every X ∈ L T and every t,
Properties of Recursive α-maxmin Expected Utility and the Certainty Equivalent
In this section, we study the properties of the continuous-time α-maxmin utility function as given by
for the time 0 utility and
for the dynamic utility process. We start with the basic continuity properties and dynamic consistency.
Proposition 1 Let u be continuous and strictly increasing. Then the nonlinear expected-utility functional U :
Let us now come to risk aversion. As the utility functional U is not concave, one might wonder if U displays risk aversion. We will show that for a natural extension of the concept of risk aversion to Knightian uncertainty, risk aversion is still equivalent to the concavity of the Bernoulli utility function u.
Proposition 2 Let u ∈ C 2 (R) be increasing. The agent is conditionally E-risk averse if and only if u is concave.
We continue with a discussion of the certainty equivalent and extend the Arrow-Pratt analysis.
holds true.
For derivation of the second-order approximation of the certainty equivalent consider a given wealth w ∈ R and denote the absolute risk aversion by
. For a Taylor expansion, we need some further terminology:
refers to the so-called coexpectation and quantifies the compensation for the nonlinearity of E. 6 The case a = 0 in Example 1, yields a sub-linear expectation, hence co(·, ·) ≥ 0.
Theorem 3 Let u be concave and twice differentiable and E be an α-maxmin conditional expectation. Then,
where X with E[X] = 0 denotes a centered distortion.
For perspective, we state two examples in a static setup, that investigate the role of the coexpectation and the resulting uncertainty premium.
Example 2 Let the normally distributed distortion X be ambiguous in the volatility parameter, i.e. Law Pσ (X) = N (0, σ).
To calculate the co-part in (7) for arbitrary α ∈ [0, 1], we begin with
Every α ≤ 1 2 yields a positive coexpectation. The following example discusses the quantitative differences of risk premia when comparing with the standard expected utility model. 
. We compare the quantitative effect with a linear expectation P = ( 1 2 , 1 2 ) ∈ ∆(Ω).
For expected utilities, take u(x) = √ x as the utility index. Consider the gamble X = (1, 4). A direct calculation yields
and similarly for the expected utilities we derive E(
Since the inverse of √
x is x 2 , we then have for the certainty equivalents C X ≈ 2.34 > 2.25 = C X . In contrast to the risk premium R(X) under P , the uncertainty premium R(X) = C X − E[X] contains a nonlinear component. The second term in the decomposition R(X) + (R(X) − R(X)) results in an ambiguity premium.
For a small distortion, the example points out that under a nonlinear expectation the uncertainty premium may vary considerably in comparison to the linear case. This is consistent with the derivations in (7), where the coexpectation co : L T × L T → R controls this issue. The possibly negative ambiguity premium, caused by preferences for ambiguity, is manifested in the nonlinear behavior of the risk premium R(X).
We extend the concept of certainty equivalent now to the dynamic case and begin with the complete description of the conditional certainty equivalent C X t = u −1 (U t (X)). Proposition 3 Let u ∈ C 2 (R) be strictly increasing and concave and X ∈ L T . The conditional certainty equivalent C X t satisfies the following:
. Then, the pair (C X t , σ C t ) solves
Since σ C t · σ C t is the derivative of the quadratic variation C X of C X , the variance multiplier of (7) appears again in the conditional version (8). From this perspective, (8) describes the local decomposition of the conditional certainty equivalent. The residual compensation
t stems from the nonlinearity of the expectation and corresponds to the coexpectation in the static approximation of Theorem 3.
So far, we have fixed the time T of the payoff. To discuss aspects about time consistency of the certainty equivalent, we need to vary the terminal time. For fixed 0 ≤ t < ∞, define as in (5):
For given X ∈ L t , (9) has a unique solution by the same arguments as before.
The two time parameters in (9) corresponds to (5) via E t,T = E t .
Definition 4 Let u ∈ C 2 (R) be strictly increasing and concave and X ∈ L t . The dynamic certainty equivalent C s,t :
where (E s,t [u(X)], σ s ) s≤t is the unique solution of (9).
The conditional certainty equivalent of Proposition 3 considers a fixed t = T . The dynamic certainty equivalent has the following properties.
Proposition 4 For 0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ t < ∞, A ∈ F s and X, Y ∈ L t , the following properties hold:
The type of recursivity for the dynamic certainty equivalent is illustrated in Figure 2 . The certainty equivalent of X on [r, t] can be obtained directly.
Figure 2: Time consistency of dynamic certainty equivalent
Another way determines C s,t for X in a first step and then evaluate C s,t (X) under the dynamic certainty equivalent on [r, s].
Applications to Dynamic Asset Pricing

A Consumption-Based CAPM with Mild Optimism
Consider a single agent economy with aggregate endowment de t = µ e t dt + σ e t dB t and cumulative dividend process dD t = µ D t dt + σ D t dB t of a long-lived asset with initial conditions e 0 , D 0 ∈ R ++ and adapted integrable processes µ e t , µ D t and σ e t , σ D t . Assume a variant of the martingale generator condition (see Section 10 D in Duffie (1996) for a detailed account): σ D t > 0 almost everywhere. At time t, the α-maxmin expected utility of the representative agent is
where u is a concave and three-times differentiable. If a t is sufficiently close to 1, as discussed in Example 4 below, σ → e(t, σ) is sub-linear, the generator of E t in (5). Then, E t [X] = min P ∈P Θ E P t [X] results in a super-linear expectation.
Example 4 Consider only a constant weighting process a t = a ∈ [0, 1] and the case of κ-ignorance, i.e., Θ t = [−κ, κ] and κ ∈ R + . The generator e of the α-maximin expectation in (5) simplifies considerably:
If a > 1 2 , e is sub-linear and yields a super-linear expectation given by
Consequently, optimism appears as a shrinkage of the size of ambiguity in E t .
Departing from Example 4, we restrict the subsequent analysis to a weight process a t that is sufficiently close to 1 in a way the nonlinear expectation remains super-linear. In view of Example 4, the residual ambiguity is denoted
The resulting concavity of c → U 0 (c) allows to follow Section 2.4 of Beißner (2015) for the single-agent case and parts of Section 5 in Chen and Epstein (2002) . By the assumptions on Θ and the linearity of P → E P X, there is a minimizing density process θ * ∈ Θ such that 7 U t (e) = min
for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Under P θ * ∈ P, the state-price density at time t is given by ψ t = u (e t ). 8 Assuming a complete market, standard arguments yield a description of the risky asset by a stochastic Euler equation
The process z θ * t = dP θ * dP |F t is given by (2) and, by virtue of (10), solves
With the Euler equation in (11) we follow the arguments in Section 10 H of Duffie (1996) to derive a consumption-based CAPM relation. Furthermore, the asset price can be rewritten as the cumulative return dSt St = dR t = µ R t dt+σ R t dB t , for details see Section 6D in Duffie (1996) .
u (x) denotes the degree of absolute prudence. The measure of abolute risk aversion is again denoted by A(x).
Theorem 4 (CCAPM) Assume that drift ambiguity is symmetric, i.e., Θ t = [−θ t , θ t ], with θ t > 0, and suppose optimism is mild, i.e., a t ∈ [ 1 2 , 1]. Then there exists a security spot market in which, at any time t, the excess return of the security satisfies
The equilibrium interest rate satisfies
The second term of the right hand side of (13) refers to the ambiguity premium under mild optimism and yields a refined explanation of the equity premium. Specifically, the ambiguity premium becomes a function of a t . The comparative statics are as follows: an increase in optimism, that is a decrease of a t , yields a smaller ambiguity premium. This functional dependency has an intuitive appeal, as preferences for ambiguity, encoded in E t and given by a t , directly quantifies the size of the ambiguity premium via the optimism factor (2a t − 1). The boundary case a t = 1 2 let the ambiguity premium vanish. In the case of no optimism, a t = 1, we get the CCAPM formula of Chen and Epstein (2002) .
In several cases, the process σ U t in (13) can be written explicitly. This is to some extend of importance, as the sign of σ U t determines the form of the ambiguity premium.
Example 5 Suppose the aggregate endowment follows a geometric Brownian motion de t = e t µ e dt + σ e dB t starting in e 0 = 1. The degree of ambiguity is given by Θ ≡ [−κ, κ]. Consider u(x) = (x β − 1)/β, with β ∈ (−∞, 1] \ {0} and let a ∈ [ 1 2 , 1]. These additional assumptions on the primitives allows for an explicit formulation 10 of
where ρ(a) = −β µ e − 1−β 2 (σ e ) 2 − (1 − 2a)κ|σ e | is linear and decreasing in a. Following ? about the stylized facts on aggregate consumption, set σ e = µ e = 2%. A moderate relative risk aversion of 2 with β = −1 yields a positive ρ(a) ≈ κ 25 a and consequently sgn(σ U t ) = 1 almost everywhere. The ambiguity premium in (13) takes now the simple form (2a − 1)κσ R t .
Application to Indifference Pricing
The dynamic certainty equivalent studied in Section 4 enables us to price contingent claims also via indifference pricing. This yields an alternative time consistent pricing principle. The novelty of the present modeling rests on the non-concave utility specification X → E[u(X)]. Hodges and Neuberger (1989) first use certainty equivalents to price claims in a static setting, i.e., from the seller point of view the indifference price is the smallest amount money π ∈ R that the seller would willingly sell the claims X:
Indifference pricing under E P can be extended to our dynamically consistent version of α-maxmin expected utility. Let the utility index be twice differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. From Definition 4, for fixed τ > s, the dynamic certainty equivalent of a claim X ∈ L τ at time s, π s (X) ∈ L s , satisfies u π s (X) = E s,τ [u(X)]. (E s,τ [u(X)], σ s ) s≤τ is the unique solution of (9), with terminal condition E τ,τ [u(X)] = u(X). Thus we define the pricing rule as the certainty equivalent:
π s (X) is the amount of money that the decision maker would pay at time s for the claim X with maturity at time τ . By virtue of Proposition 4, the indifference pricing rule π s : L τ → L s is time-consistent, monotone increasing and satisfies the zero-one law. Furthermore, by the Jensen inequality (see Appendix B) for E s,τ with fixed τ the price of X satisfies π s (X) ≤ E s,τ [X]. We now consider the special case of extreme pessimism. In view of Example 1, we set a = 1. This particular case captures a form of robust utility indifference pricing by incorporating risk aversion and model uncertainty.
Example 6 For fixed t > 0, let (U s ) s∈[0,τ ] be a dynamic worst case expected utility defined by U s (X) = min P ∈P E P s [u(X)], s ∈ [0, τ ]. For s < τ , we define the dynamic certainty equivalent of a X ∈ L t as above. The pricing rule becomes
From this expression, it is apparent that preferences for risk and ambiguity are again disentangled. As argued above, π s : L τ → L s is time-consistent, monotone and satisfies the zero-one law. Moreover, the price of X defined by the certainty equivalent is less than min P ∈P E P s [X].
Conclusion
We have derived a dynamically consistent extension of the α-maxmin model. In continuous time, the time-consistent version retains the α-maxmin structure and thus allows to distinguish ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, as the static model does.
We characterize risk aversion through the concavity of Bernoulli utility functions. The Arrow-Pratt approximation of the certainty equivalent contains an additional ambiguity premium that depends on the nonlinearity of the expectation and therefore on local ambiguity attitudes.
We present a consumption-based CAPM formula that allows to explain how the interplay of optimism and pessimism affects the excess return in terms of an ambiguity premium. Optimism can decrease the ambiguity premium.
We finally characterize the dynamic certainty equivalent and use it to discuss the consequences for indifference pricing.
A Backward stochastic differential equations
For the convenience of the reader, we gather some results on backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE) here. Pardoux and Peng (1990) introduced the following equation:
where the terminal condition X ∈ L T and f : Ω × [0, T ] × R × R → R, so that the generator f (·, y, z) of the BSDE is an adapted process for every y, z ∈ R.
A pair of adapted real-valued processes (y, σ) is called a solution of the above BSDE, if E P [sup t |y t | 2 ] < ∞, E P [ T 0 |σ t | 2 dt] < ∞ and (y, σ) satisfies (15). Pardoux and Peng (1990) obtained the following existence and uniqueness of the solution of (15).
Lemma 1 If E P [
T 0 |f (t, 0, 0)| 2 dt] < ∞ and f (t, ·, ·) is Lipschitz continuous on R × R , then the above BSDE has a unique adapted solution (y, σ).
B Properties of Equation (5)
In view of (15), the BSDE in (5) considers the following generator
where Θ captures the multiple prior uncertainty P.
Proposition 5 Let a ∈ |[0, 1]| and P be an arbitrary specification of an αmaxmin conditional expectation E t . For every X ∈ L T , there exists a unique solution (E t [X], σ t ) of equation (5). Moreover, the following properties hold true for every s, t ∈ [0, T ], X, Y ∈ L T :
(v) Zero-one law:
, for all η ≥ 0.
(vii) Jensen inequality:
If u ∈ C 2 (R) is increasing and concave, then
By 1 A , for some A ∈ F, we denote the usual indicator function, being 1 on A and 0 on A c = Ω \ A. Proof: We start with the uniqueness and existence of the solution of the BSDE. For all x, y ∈ R, we have
Since Θ is compact, then there exists a positive constant C such that
Therefore, e(t, ·) is uniformly Lipschitz and e(t, 0) = 0, then from Lemma 1 in Appendix A, equation (5) has a unique solution, Properties (i) to (v) directly follow from from Lemma 36.6 and Theorem 37.3 in Peng (1997) .
To show (vi), note that for all x ∈ R, β > 0, we have positive homogeneity of e(t, x)
Application of Lemma 36.9 (see also Example 10 therein) in Peng (1997) gives us (vi).
Since u ∈ C 2 (R) is increasing and concave, we can get (vii) from Theorem 1 in Jia and Peng (2010) . 2
C Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 In order to prove that the family (U i∆ ) i=0,...,N is dynamically-consistent, we only need to show that for i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, and
. From the definition of I t [X], t ∈ [0, T ], we know that I t [X] is increasing in X. Therefore,
from which we complete the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2 For
Let (E t [u(X)], σ t ) and (E t [u(X)], σ t ) be the solutions of the following BSDEs, respectively,
Let (E t [u(X)], σ t ) be the solutions of the following BSDEs.
Then, using the standard estimates of BSDEs (16) and (18), there exists a constant C (C is independent of ∆ and can be different from line to line) such that
In a similar way, we have the following estimate of BSDEs (17) and (18) 
Therefore,
For t ∈ [t N N −2 , t N N −1 ), we have
Let (E t [X], σ t ) and (E t [X], σ t ) be the solutions of the following BSDEs, respectively,
and
Then
Therefore, using the standard estimates of BSDEs (18) and (21), there exists a constant C (C is independent of ∆ and can be different from line to line) such that
From (19) it follows that
In a similar way, we have the following estimate of BSDEs (5) and (20)
Using the above approach, we can prove that, for all t ∈ [t N i , t N i+1 ), i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 2, Proof of Proposition 1 (i) The continuity follows from the presence of a dominating subliner expectation, which implies norm-continuity.
(ii) We just give the proof when {X n } n≥1 is decreasing. From the monotonicity of the nonlinear expectation E, we know that {U (X n )} n≥1 is decreasing.
Since {X n } n≥1 is decreasing and lim n→∞ X n = X, P-a.s., we get that |u(X n ) − u(X)| ≤ |u(X n )| + |u(X)| ∈ L T , and lim n→∞ |u(X n ) − u(X)| = 0, P-a.s. Then by virtue of the dominated convergence theorem we have, lim n→∞ E P |u(X n )−u(X)| 2 = 0. From (vii) in Proposition 5 we know that, there is a constant C > 0 such that, |U (X n ) − U (X)| 2 ≤ CE P |u(X n ) − u(X)| 2 , from which we can get lim n→∞ U (X n ) = U (X).
(iii) Since X ≥ Y , P-a.s., and u is increasing, we have u(X) ≥ u(Y ), P-a.s. From (i) in Proposition 5 it follows that
Moreover, if P(X > Y ) > 0 and u is strictly increasing, then P(u(X) > u(Y )) > 0. Using (i) in Proposition 5 again
(iv) By (i) and (iii) in Proposition 5, it is easily to get this.
Proof of Proposition 2 Since e(t, σ) is a convex combination of an inf and sup operation, e(t, σ) is positive homogeneous in σ. By an application of Theorem 3.2 in Jia and Peng (2010) to e(t, σ), which is independent of E t [X], the conditional E-concavity, i.e., u(E t [X]) ≥ E t [u(X)], can be characterized as follow 1 2
u (x)|σ| 2 + e(t, u (x)σ) − u (x)e(t, σ) ≤ 0
By the positive homogeneity of e(t, ·) this is equivalent to u (x) ≤ 0, being equivalent to concavity.
Proof of Theorem 3
We consider the second-order Taylor expansion around w for u(w)
where we applied the concavity of u via u ≥ 0, u ≤ 0 and Proposition 5 (iv) and (iv). Using the first-order Taylor expansion for u(C w+X ) around w: u(C w+X ) ≈ u(w) + u (w)(C w+X − w).
Combining both approximations establishes the desired result.
(v) Since
Let us consider the following two BSDEs dE s,t [u(X)] =ê(σ 1 s )ds + σ 1 s dB s , E t,t [u(X)] = u(X),
Then (23) 
